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INTRODUCTION
Juvenile offenders' no longer have a place on death row.2 On
March 1, 2005, the United States Supreme Court categorically abol-
ished the juvenile death penalty, holding that the sentencing to death
of an individual who was under the age of eighteen at the time of his
offense violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
• • 3
United States Constitution. To distinguish between the culpability of
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I In this Comment, the term 'Juvenile offenders" refers to children and teenagers
who, despite their age at the time of their actions, have been tried and sentenced as
adults in criminal court. Many of these 'juvenile offenders" are inevitably adults by the
time they are convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned. I use the term generally--it is not
synonymous with the special "youthful offender" and 'juvenile offender" designations
that individual states sometimes use. See Simon I. Singer et al., The Reproduction ofJuve-
nile Justice in Criminal Court: A Case Study of New York's Juvenile Offender Law, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE
CRIMINAL COURT 353, 353-75 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (tracing
New York's legislative attempts to deal with juveniles in the adult court setting).
2 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), spared Christopher Simmons's life and
the lives of over seventy otherjuvenile offenders. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court,
5-4, Forbids Execution in Juvenile Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at Al (reporting that
the Court's decision would bar execution of seventy-two people on death row); David
G. Savage, Supreme Court Bans Execution ofJuveniles, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2005, at Al (not-
ing the Court's opinion that even a cold-blooded juvenile criminal such as Simmons
did not deserve to be executed).
3 Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, overruled Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), which
held that the death penalty could be imposed on offenders who were between sixteen
and eighteen years of age at the time of their offense. In this Comment, 'juvenile" re-
fers to youths under the age of eighteen at the time of their offenses. 'Juvenile death
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a child and an adult, the Court in Roper v. Simmons 4 relied on a grow-
ing national consensus against the juvenile death penalty, social sci-
ence and neurodevelopmental research, and international legal stan-
dards. 5  Recognizing that developmental differences contribute to
culpability, the Court differentiated between juveniles and adults
based solely on chronological age and categorically safeguarded any
juvenile convicted of a state or federal crime from a court's or legisla-
ture's6 imposition of a death penalty sentence.7
Roper v. Simmons removed juvenile execution from the variety of
sentences available to prosecutors and courts, but its broader implica-
tions for the juvenile justice system and juvenile sentencing schemes
have yet to be realized. Although the Court, in fashioning its argu-
ment, relied on international standards and compacts that prohibited
the juvenile death penalty, it conceded that juveniles could still be
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP)-a sen-
tence that these same compacts denounced.8 The Court affirmed the
penalty" refers to the sentence of death imposed on a defendant who was under eight-
een at the time of his offense. 'Juvenile life without parole" and 'Juvenile LWOP" re-
fer to a defendant who has been tried as an adult in adult criminal court and sen-
tenced to life in prison without possibility of parole, although under eighteen at the
time of his offense.
4 Roper broke with Supreme Court precedent that had allowed for the imposition
ofjuvenile death sentences on persons who were sixteen and seventeen years of age at
the time of their offense. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. Of course, the Roper decision,
which was decided by a slim margin of 5-4, was not without vehement opposition: Jus-
tice Scalia actually read portions of his dissent from the bench on the day the case was
orally announced. See Edward Lazarus, Roper v. Simmons: Insights from the Perspective of
Justice Blackmun's Former Law Clerk, 82 DENV. U. L. REv. 723, 723-24 (2005).
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
In this Comment, a legislature's imposition of the juvenile death penalty refers
to mandatory sentencing schemes that give judges no discretion to allow for mitigating
factors when sentencing a defendant.
7 Recent case law holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments bar the
execution of mentally retarded persons formed the basis for the Court's reasoning in
Roper. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) ("Because of [mentally retarded
persons'] impairments, however, by definition they have diminished capacities to un-
derstand and process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to un-
derstand the reactions of others.... Their deficiencies do not warrant an exemption
from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability."), abrogating
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
" See AMNESTY INT'L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2005) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH] (noting that the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
forbids "life imprisonment without possibility of release" for "offenses committed by
persons below eighteen years of age"). As may be obvious from our federal and state
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Missouri Supreme Court decision, which resentenced Simmons to
"life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release
except by act of the Governor."9 In doing so, the Court implied that it
did not view such a sentence as cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, in its decision to
abolish the juvenile death penalty, the Court seemed to approve the
use of LWOP sentences againstjuvenile offenders. 0
Roper's legacy is questionable. What do the Court's broad find-
ings, but rather limited holding, mean for the numerous post-Roper
youth that encounter the criminal justice system?" Despite the mag-
nitude of its effect on states' treatments of juveniles, Roper was warmly
received. 12 The Court's reasoning, however, does not appear to have
sentencing schemes, which previously allowed juvenile death penalties and presently
allow juvenile LWOP sentences, when the United States ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1992, it did not fully agree to the
protections offered children. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
U.S. Reservations 5, June 8, 1992, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR, U.S. Reser-
vations] (reserving the right to treatjuveniles as adults with respect to the criminal jus-
tice system and military service). In fact, the United States' limiting reservation to its
ratification of the ICCPR stated that "the United States reserves the right, in exceptional
circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of ar-
ticle 10 and paragraph 4 of article 14." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra, at 97 (emphasis
added) (quoting ICCPR, U.S. Reservations 5).
9 Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (quoting State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397,
413 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)).
10 The Court, however, did so with some qualification, stating that "life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a
young person." Id. at 572.
" See DAVID L. MYERS, BOYS AMONG MEN: TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES AS
ADULTS 4, 6-7, 129 (2005) (discussing predictions that the U.S. juvenile population will
increase for the foreseeable future and the likely effects of the increase).
12 Atkins v. Virginia held the execution of mentally retarded persons to be constitu-
tionally impermissible and may have primed the country for the Roper decision. 536
U.S. 304 (2002). In addition, eight states submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting
the abolition of the juvenile death penalty. See Brief of New York et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-0633),
2004 WL 1636449 (urging on behalf of New York, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Mexico, Oregon, and West Virginia that a consensus had developed against exe-
cution of juveniles). Other amici supporting Simmons included the American Bar,
Psychological, Medical, and Psychiatric Associations, the European Union, foreign
leaders, diplomats, and former President Jimmy Carter, as well as countless human
rights organizations, defender associations, juvenile advocates, and religious groups.
See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Ass'n in Support of the Respondent,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-0633), 2004 WL 1617399; Brief for the
American Psychological Ass'n and the Missouri Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-0633), 2004
WL 1636447; Brief of Amici Curiae former U.S. Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al. in
Support of Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-0633), 2004
2008] 1051
1052 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:1049
had ripple effects. States' treatment of juvenile offenders remains
largely unaltered. Children deemed to be serious juvenile offenders
are still thrust into adult courts and are subjected to adult sentencing
schemes. Roper's reasoning raises questions as to why these children
are treated differently than their juvenile court peers. Some in-
creased level of supervision or incapacitation may be necessary for
more violent juvenile offenders, but Roper begs the question of
whether unreformable, "superpredator"'
' 4 children really exist. 15
Although arguments exist for abolishing juvenile LWOP sentences
as cruel and unusual punishment that violates the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments, I will not focus here on constitutional argu-
WL 1636448; Brief of Amici Curiae President James Earl Carter, Jr., et al., Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-0633), 2004 WL 1636446. But see Tom Parker,
Op-Ed., Alabama Justices Surrender to Judicial Activism, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 1, 2006,
at 4B (expressing an Alabama Supreme CourtJudge's opinion that the Alabama courts
should continue to impose juvenile death sentences because the Roper opinion was an
unconstitutional act ofjudicial activism by the Court). Some scholars have criticized
Roper's constitutional analysis. See infra note 36 (citing two law review articles that
question, for example, the persuasiveness of the opinion's international comparisons).
13 In juvenile courts, the focus is largely one of individual treatment and rehabili-
tation. Children are adjudicated delinquent rather than convicted, and outcomes are
determined at disposition rather than at sentencing. The existence ofjuvenile courts
illustrates our recognition of youths' development and children's amenability to
treatment. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 53940 (1971).
14 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 7 (explaining the rise of the "superpredator" rheto-
ric). See generally PETER ELIKANN, SUPERPREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR
CHILDREN BY THE LAw 1-20 (1999) (defining "superpredator" as a popular term used
to refer to the dehumanizing of juveniles into amoral and dangerous creatures as a
result of an increase in youth violence).
15 At Simmons's sentencing, the Missouri prosecutor attempted to capitalize on
the public fear of superpredator children in arguing for the death penalty. In re-
sponse to defense counsel's argument that age was a mitigating factor, the prosecutor
replied, "Age, he says. Think about age. Seventeen years old. Isn't that scary?
Doesn't that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary."
Roper, 543 U.S. at 558.
16 Federal courts have held that felony-murder LWOP sentences for juvenile of-
fenders are not unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Harris v.
Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 584-85 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that such sentences do not
counter evolving standards of decency and are not disproportionate to the murder of-
fense). Such arguments have, however, been raised in the post-Roper context. See
Hillary J. Massey, Note, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life
Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083 (2006) (asserting that Roper's reasoning
supports the premise that juvenile LWOP sentences violate the Eighth Amendment).
Other authors advocate disallowing the sentences under a constitutionalized infancy
defense. See Steven A. Drizin & Allison McGowen Keegan, Abolishing the Use of the Fel-
ony-Murder Rule When the Defendant Is a Teenager, 28 NOVA L. REv. 507, 541 (2004) (ar-
guing that both the young age of juveniles and the nature of felony murder make an
LWOP sentence overly draconian).
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ments."7 The Court's dicta in Roper v. Simmons seem to foreclose im-
mediate Eighth Amendment challenges to juvenile LWOP sentences.
Instead, this Comment seeks to show that the Court's recognition of
three main differences between juveniles and adults' s leaves open to
principled attack one of the major doctrinal hooks for gaining adult
court jurisdiction over juveniles, and one of the main factors in
lengthy juvenile incarcerations and juvenile LWOP sentences: prose-
cutors' use of felony-murder charges.' 9
Part I briefly describes the Court's reasoning in Roper. Part II then
reviews the diminished scope ofjuvenile courtjurisdiction and the his-
torical trend toward treating juveniles as adults. It explains how, in• - 20
the absence of a constitutional right to be tried as a juvenile, three
mechanisms have been employed to bring juveniles into adult 
court. 21
Part III critically examines the felony-murder rule and the assump-
tions underlying the doctrine. Part IV provides a vignette that illus-
trates the interaction among felony-murder charges, waiver provisions,
mandatory sentencing schemes, and juvenile LWOP sentences. Fi-
nally, Part V argues that, in light of the Court's reasoning in Roper, fel-
ony-murder charges should be categorically excluded as applied to ju-
17 At the time Roper was decided, thirty states were not applying the death penalty
to juvenile offenders, and only seven states had executed any juvenile offenders in the
preceding thirty years. HOwARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR. FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 23940
(2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf.
Unlike Roper's ratification of states' independent movements and the growing national
consensus against the juvenile death penalty, a similar climate has yet to emerge with
respect to the imposition of juvenile LWOP sentences. And given the Roper Court's
endorsement of Simmons's LWOP sentence and the lack of movement in state legisla-
tures to denounce the rule, I will therefore refrain from making a constitutional argu-
ment under the Eighth Amendment because the argument seems unlikely to prevail in
the current legislative and judicial climate. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (noting that
legislation is an objective indicator of "evolving standards of decency" and "contempo-
rary values"). Instead, I will seek to promote legislatures' post-Roper adoption of better
youth crime policies.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 28-34 (discussing the implications of the
Court's differentiations between adults and children).
19 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 27 (referring to a survey suggesting
that 26% of youth offenders sentenced to LWOP were charged with felony murder).
20 Although the United States Supreme Court has held that due process is re-
quired in juvenile proceedings, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), it has never held that
there is a constitutional right to have one's case adjudicated in a juvenile court. Cf
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 117 (1998) (noting that "the juve-
nile court is itself a statutory creation").
21 See infra notes 42-50 and accompanying text (detailing the processes involved in
judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative waivers).
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veniles because they run afoul of Roper's findings and represent the
antithesis of soundjuvenile crime policy.
I. THE ABOLITION OF THEJUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court addressed the fate of Christopher
Simmons, a seventeen-year-old who had resolved to kill a woman by
throwing her off of a bridge.22 Despite the heinous nature of the act,
Simmons's direct involvement in the murder, his enlistment of
younger friends, and his late-minor age of seventeen, the Court still
22expanded the principles it first developed in Thompson v. Oklahoma
and held that imposition of the death penalty against any offender
24under the age of eighteen is unconstitutional. The Court could have
waited for and granted certiorari in a case with a more sympathetic
defendant; it chose, however, to take Simmons's case-the gruesome
crime, the defendant-instigator, the direct actor, and the older ado-
lescent-and thereby signaled that its abolition of the juvenile death
penalty was unqualified.
In Thompson, a case of a fifteen-year-old sentenced to death, the
plurality supported the constitutionality of its holding by emphasizing
"civilized standards of decency"; "the views that have been expressed by
respected professional organizations, by other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
European Community" ; and the rarity of imposing juvenile death
penalties on offenders under the age of sixteen. The Court stressed
that the lack of privileges and responsibilities afforded to juveniles "also
explain [s] why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensi-
ble as that of an adult."26 In addition to juveniles' lesser culpability, the
Court also noted their inability to be deterred by the harshest punish-
22 The facts of the case are graphic. Simmons and another teen broke and en-
tered the victim's home, covered her eyes and mouth with duct tape, bound her hands,
put her in her minivan, and drove her to a state park. At the park, they covered her
head with a towel, tied her hands and feet together with electrical wire, wrapped her
face entirely in duct tape, and threw her from a bridge, drowning her. Roper, 543 U.S.
at 556-57; see also Kim Bell, Woman Thrown into River Alive, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH,
Sept. 12, 1993, at ID (providing a local account of the victim's death).
23 See 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that the juvenile death penalty was im-
permissible when imposed upon offenders who were under the age of sixteen at the
time of their offenses).
24 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
25 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
26 Id. at 835.
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ments, because youth fail to engage in "the kind of cost-benefit analysis
that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution."27
The Court's reasoning in Roper reaffirms its recognition of adoles-
cents' evolving personhood. The Court acknowledged three main dif-
ferences between adults and children as a basis for holding that the
death penalty is a disproportionate punishment when applied to juve-
niles. The Court found that juveniles (1) "lack... maturity and
[have] an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," which results in
"ill-considered actions and decisions"; 28 (2) are "more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures"; and (3)
have characters that are "not as well formed as [those] of... adult[s]"
and traits that are "more transitory, less fixed"3 0 in nature.
The implication of the first difference, lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, is that children are less likely
to foresee the consequences of their actions and process the potential
effects of their actions on others.3 ' Because they fail to engage in such
32thought processes, children are more reckless than adults and are
also less likely to be deterred by punishment. The second difference,
susceptibility to negative influences, recognizes that children are likely
to engage in negative activities with their peers and, once involved in
those activities, will have difficulty extricating themselves from a prob-S • 33
lematic situation. The implication of the last difference, the transi-
tory nature of juvenile character traits, is that children and adoles-
cents have a greater propensity for rehabilitation than adults. Despite
27 Id. at 837. But see Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper'sJuveniles: Using a Law and Eco-
nomics Approach To Show That the Logic of Roper Implies That Juveniles Require the Death Pen-
alty More Than Adults, 111 PENN. ST. L. REv. 53, 70 (2006) (arguing that juvenile "risk-
lovers" should be subject to state-imposed sanctions that include juvenile execution).
28 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
Id.; see also Roy Malone, Separate Hells Draw Tears from Murder Suspect, 2 Men, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 20, 1993, at 6 (noting Simmons's codefendant's father's
tearful statement that his son had "got[ten] in with the wrong kids").
30 Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
31 See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17
Cases, CRIM.JUST., Summer 2000, at 26, 27 (noting that adolescents often view the con-
sequences of their actions as "accidental," whereas adults would have foreseen the con-
sequences).
32 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 ("[A]dolescents are overrepresented statistically in vir-
tually every category of reckless behavior." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
33 Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adoles-
cence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003) (arguing that adolescents, "as legal minors. ...
lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a crimogenic setting")).
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any actions to the contrary, they have not yet developed an "irre-
trievably depraved character.,
34
In expanding the principles first enunciated in Thompson and
reaching its holding that the juvenile death penalty is constitutionally
impermissible cruel and unusual punishment, the Roper Court de-
parted from legal precedent and largely supported its decision with
both international norms denouncing harsh juvenile sentences and
scientific findings addressing juveniles' developing characters.35  Al-
though some scholars have focused on Roper's significance for consti-
tutional analysis,% Roper is important for other reasons. A narrow
reading of Roper limits the case merely to abolishing the juvenile death
penalty. A broader reading of the case, however, should alterjuvenile
crime policy as a whole.
The Roper Court recognized juveniles' lesser culpability, their in-
ability to anticipate the consequences of their actions, and their po-
tential for change. These findings directly impact juvenile deterrence
and retribution. Given the Court's findings about adolescent culpa-
bility and development, the next sections present the inconsistencies
between current juvenile crime policy and the Roper findings, and ad-
dress the plight of post-Roper youth who kill. More specifically, this
Comment argues against the continued use of juvenile felony-murder
charges-which can subject juveniles to the harshest sentences still
permitted by the Roper Court-in a post-Roper landscape. First, how-
ever, I explain how juveniles end up being tried in adult courts, in
which they are subjected to harsh penalties.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. The Court had commented earlier on the character-
istics of youth. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (finding that ju-
veniles' susceptibility to immature and irresponsible behavior makes their actions less
"morally reprehensible [than those] of an adult"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104,
115 (1982) ("[Youth] is a time and condition of life when a person may be most sus-
ceptible to influence and to psychological damage.").
35 See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. But cf. Steven G. Calabresi &
Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred
Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 907
(2005) (tracing the Court's use of international law over the past 216 years and con-
cluding that "[r]eferences to foreign sources... have been somewhat commonplace").
See, e.g., Youngjae Lee, International Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth
Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 63 (2007) (arguing against international consensus as per-
suasive authority in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence); Roger P. Alford, Roper v. Sim-
mons and Our Constitution in International Equipoise, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1, 1-3 (2005) (ana-
lyzing "the use of comparative constitutionalism to interpret the Eighth Amendment").
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II. THE RISE OF "ADULT CRIME, ADULT TIME" AND THE
JUVENILE "SUPERPREDATOR"
37
The nationwide existence of separate juvenile courts signifies a
difference in our treatment of juveniles and adults. Traditionally,
juvenile courts were developed as a nonpunitive system that valued
rehabilitation over retribution.39 What, then, removes children from
the realm of a nonpunitive system and thrusts them into the adult
criminal system, potentially exposing them to long-and even life-
time-prison sentences?
Both pre- and post-Roper, prosecutors, courts, advocates, and legis-
lators have struggled to respond to serious juvenile crime. 40 Legisla-
tures have responded to actual and perceived threats of youth vio-
lence by expanding juvenile transfer, or waiver, provisions.4 Waiver
provisions result in juveniles being tried as adults. Three common
37 See generally ELIKANN, supra note 14, at 10-11 (discussing the emergence of the
juvenile "superpredator" rhetoric); MYERS, supra note 11, at 1-8 (discussing the "Adult
Crime, Adult Time" mantra and superpredators); ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 49-50 (ex-
plaining the youth violence and superpredator rhetoric that incited public fear).
38 Despite these differences, however, juvenile courts are not constitutionally re-
quired; rather, they have been regarded as creatures of legislative grace. See supra note
20 and accompanying text.
39 See generally DAVID L. MYERS, EXCLUDING VIOLENT YOUTHS FROM JUVENILE
COURT: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGISLATIVE WAIVER 12-18 (2001) (tracing the devel-
opment ofjuvenile courts).
40 See Daphne Larkin, Children Charged as Adults Walking Long Hard Road,
THE BARRE MONTPELIER TIMES ARGUs, Dec. 31, 2006, available at http://
www.timesargus.com (illustrating Vermont's struggle with this question as recently as late-
December 2006). The current population of imprisoned offenders serving juvenile
LWOP sentences numbers 2225. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 1. Approxi-
mately twenty-six percent of those imprisoned on LWOP sentences were convicted of fel-
ony murder. Id. at 1-2. This estimate was published in 2005-current numbers are likely
higher as juveniles have continued to receive LWOP sentences over the last two years.
That there are over 2000 inmates nationwide who are serving LWOP sentences for acts
they committed as minors, however, illustrates that, if nothing else, the United States has
generally been tough on juvenile crime. This harsh treatment of juveniles seems in-
credibly stark when U.S. juvenile LWOP sentences are compared to those of foreign na-
tions. Human Rights Watch obtained data from 154 countries, only three of which re-
ported having inmates serving LWOP for crimes committed as children. Id. at 104-05. In
these three countries-Israel, South Africa, and Tanzania-the combined number ofju-
venile LWOP inmates is less than a dozen individuals. Id. at 106.
41 See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (providing statistics regarding the
prevalence of youth prosecutions in adult courts); see also David S. Tanenhaus, The Evo-
lution of Transfer Out of the Juvenile Court, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 13, 13-33 (providing a historical account of transfer laws).
42 Juvenile court jurisdiction and court-mandated dispositional placements typi-
cally extend only until a child's eighteenth or twenty-first birthday. Some states, how-
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mechanisms through which juveniles are brought under an adult
criminal court's jurisdiction include judicial waiver, prosecutorial
waiver, and legislative waiver or "exclusion."43 Underjudicial waiver, a
case is filed initially in the juvenile court; it may then be transferred to
an adult court at the juvenile judge's discretion, either following a
hearing 44 or as a legislative mandate, if the judge determines that the
statutory requirements of a presumptive waiver are met.45 Prosecuto-
rial waiver, also known as direct file or concurrent jurisdiction, 46 gives
prosecutors the choice to file charges in either juvenile or adult court
depending on factors that include the child's age, the type of offense,
and any history of court involvement. 47  Legislative exclusion, cur-
481
rently the most commonly used transfer mechanism, statutorily re-
moves the juvenile court's jurisdiction to hear certain offenses, thus
mandating criminal court jurisdiction over certain defendants and
certain crimes, which generally include violent felonies and felony
murder. Incidental to waiver provisions is the lowering of the mini-
ever, have set upper age limits of twenty-four years of age on some court-mandated
placements. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 17, at 103 (reporting state upper age
limits on dispositional placements in delinquency cases). Waiver provisions, however,
remove juveniles from even these juvenile court sentencing schemes.
43 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 40-47 (explaining different types of waiver provi-
sions). Jurisdictional transfers occur under the presumption of an increased need for
public safety against the offender. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 17, at 96-99
(explaining that a massive shift in states' responses to juveniles undertaken between
1992-1997 largely occurred in five areas of the law: transfer provisions, sentencing au-
thority, confidentiality, victims' rights, and correctional programming).
See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966) (holding that transfer hearings
were required prior to a juvenile court waiving jurisdiction); see also Robert 0. Dawson,
Judicial Waiver in 77Teory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OFJUVENILEJUSTICE, su-
pra note 1, at 45, 51-63 (listing common features ofjudicial waiver schemes post-Kent).
45 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 42-43 (explaining discretionary and presumptive
waivers, as well as allocations of the burden of proof).
46 SNYDER& SICKMUND, supra note 17, at 110.
47 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 43-44 (noting that prosecutorial waiver may be the
most controversial of the three transfer mechanisms since it substitutes a prosecutor's
judgment for ajudge's discretion and eliminates the opportunity for a transfer hearing).
As of 2004, approximately fifteen states allowed for prosecutorial discretion in filing
charges either in juvenile or adult court. SNYDER& SICKMUND, supra note 17, at 113.
48 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 45 ("Legislatures in 29 states currently have ex-
cluded certain offenses .. "); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 17, at 113; Drizin &
Keegan, supra note 16, at 53840 (noting that the trend away from judicial waiver-
which allowed a juvenile court to waive jurisdiction-toward legislative exclusion has
resulted in a "more rigid and less flexible"justice system).
49 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 45 (discussing the most commonly excluded
crimes); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 27 ("Almost 93 percent of the
youth sentenced to life without parole were convicted of homicide."). See generally
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mum age for adult court jurisdiction, wherein legislatures redefine
"adult" under substantive criminal laws and thus allow criminal courts
to exercise jurisdiction over even the youngest of children.)°
Modern juvenile transfer provisions have gained acceptance and
momentum since their first appearance in the mid- to late 1980s.5'
More extensive and rigid waiver provisions resulted from apocalyptic
predictions of juvenile superpredators that would descend upon the
streets of America as the teenage population increased. Research
and public opinion polls have revealed that although the public gen-
erally supports the transfer ofjuveniles to adult court, it does not favor
giving juveniles full adult sentences, placing them in adult correc-
tional facilities, or abandoning rehabilitative goals. 53  Although the
Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A Histoy and
Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 83, 83-129
(analyzing legislative exclusion and concluding that most of these laws "do not provide
either a jurisprudentially satisfactory or principled legal answer to the question of
which youths states would prosecute as adults").
t0 Pennsylvania, for example, has no statutory minimum age requirement for the
adult prosecution of a child who has committed murder. In fact, the juvenile court is
excluded from exercising jurisdiction over any child who has committed murder. The
minimum age for any prosecution, however, is ten years. See generally Nat'l Ctr. for Ju-
venile Justice, Pennsylania, http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles (select "Pennsylvania"
from "State Profiles" drop-down menu) (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (providing current
Pennsylvania transfer provisions). This exclusion means that any ten-year-old child
who is charged with murder must first be charged as an adult. The child then bears
the burden of convincing the adult court to grant a reverse waiver, which enables the
court to transfer a child's case to the juvenile court. See MYERS, supra note 11, at 45-46
(explaining reverse waiver and blended sentencing). Legislative exclusion can thus
seem counterintuitive or illogical for serious child offenders. Absent any reverse
waiver, a ten-year-old child, who has onlyjust become eligible for any sort ofjuvenile or
criminal prosecution, is automatically subject to adult prosecution-and potentially, a
lengthy sentence-if the offense is murder.
51 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 39-40, 95-97 (explaining that the emergence of
modern transfer mechanisms coincided with increases in serious juvenile offenses,
weapons use, and public concern over increasingly violent youth).
52 See MYERS, supra note 39, at 19-21 (explaining the effect of social science studies
on public policy). As social scientists predicted sharp rises in the juvenile population,
they posited that increased youth violence would follow. Between 1992 and 1995,
forty-seven states and the District of Columbia prepared for a surge in remorseless, vio-
lent offenders by strengthening their juvenile and criminal codes. Id. at 20-21; see also
id. at 26-27 (noting that during this period, "41 states passed laws seeking to ease the
transfer of juveniles to adult court... [and] over 30 states either established or ex-
panded their legislative waiver laws"). See generally ZIMRING, SUpra note 20, at 3-16
(comparing the legislative responses of the 1990s to predicted increases in youth vio-
lence to those of the 1970s).
53 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 9-10, 127.
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use of judicial waivers has remained relatively constant,54 most legisla-
tures have continued to expand their waiver provisions.
55
Prosecutorial waiver and legislative exclusion account for the ma-
jority ofjuvenile transfers and generally apply to enumerated felonies,
which include felony murder. The prevalence of waiver provisions
means that children and teens charged with felony murder will most
often enter the justice system through adult criminal courts. These
children then bear the burden of convincing a court to invoke a re-
verse waiver, which allows their case to be transferred to a juvenile
court, despite the seriousness of the charges that have been filed. 56
Children charged with and convicted of felony murder have par-
ticipated in felony-level offenses that have resulted in death. These
children pose a significant challenge for the justice system 7-they
may not have intended to take a life, but did all the same. Absent a
reverse waiver, however, Roper's findings still persist in the adult court-
54 See id. at 47-48 (noting that judicial waiver of juveniles has remained roughly
consistent, applying to only about one percent of juveniles or approximately 7500
youth nationwide, and is responsible for at most ten percent of the youths in adult
court); cf SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 17, at 113 ("In Florida, which has [broad
prosecutorial discretion], prosecutors sent more than 2,000 youth to criminal court in
fiscal year 2001. In comparison, juvenile court judges nationwide waived fewer than
6,000 cases to criminal court in 2000.").
5 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 48, 54, 97 (positing that about 200,000 youth are
prosecuted in adult courts each year and that approximately 15,000 youth under the
age of eighteen are incarcerated in adult prisons on any given day); see also ZIMRING,
supra note 20, at 73 (explaining how the superpredator rhetoric dehumanizes young-
sters and thwarts a public backlash to harsh legislative policies). For a state-by-state
breakdown of how juveniles enter criminal courts, see SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note
17, at 111 tbl. (tabulating states' differing approaches to imposing "adult sanctions on
offenders ofjuvenile age").
56 See supra notes 43, 48, and accompanying text. For reverse waiver, a juvenile is
normally required to show that rehabilitation can best be achieved in a juvenile setting
and that public safety will not be compromised by the transfer of the case to the juve-
nile court. Twenty-five states have reverse waiver provisions. SNYDER & SICKMUND, su-
pra note 17, at 116.
57 See ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 131 (explaining that "the combination of high
levels of personal culpability and the worst-case outcome puts maximum pressure on
the legal system to generate extensive punishment" and that homicides act as "difficult
but important tests of the general principles that are supposed to be in play through-
out the system"). The sentence ultimately imposed in a felony-murder case will de-
pend upon the discretion provided to the judiciary under the state's sentencing
scheme and its classification of felony murder as murder or a graded murder offense,
such as first- or second-degree murder. See infra Parts III-V (examining the rationale
for the felony-murder doctrine and discussing its implications and limits since Roper).
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room. 5  The Court's findings are based on offenders' chronological
ages, not legal ages. 59 As a result, legally redefining children as adults
by subjecting them to adult court jurisdiction does not undermine
Roper's reasoning. 6° The Court's acknowledgement of differences be-
tween juveniles and adults was not restricted to defendants sentenced
to the death penalty. Rather, Roper sought to correct the classification
of children as "among the worst offenders., 61 Regardless of the rea-
sons for prosecuting juveniles in adult court, Roper applies because its
findings as to juvenile culpability, deterrence, retribution, and reha-
bilitation extend to the most harshly treatedjuveniles .62
Juvenile transfer undeniably shapes a case's outcome, and thus, a
child's life. Studies show that conviction rates for youth are similar in
adult and juvenile courts, but that for violent offenders, correspond-
ing sentences are harsher and lengthier in the adult system than in
63the juvenile system. Juveniles incarcerated in adult facilities are also
at a higher risk of violent attacks, sexual assaults, and suicide than
their peers placed in juvenile facilities. 64 Because of their lengthy
prison stays,juveniles serving harsh sentences face an increased risk of
58 Roper was decided in the context of a juvenile, Simmons, who was legislatively
redefined and tried as an adult in criminal court. 542 U.S. 551, 557 (2005).
59 See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
60 See Ellen Marrus & Irene Merker Rosenberg, After Roper v. Simmons: Keeping
Kids Out of Adult Criminal Court, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1151, 1162 (2005) (explaining
that Texas could not avoid the Roper decision just because seventeen-year-olds were
(and still are) considered adults in the state); see also ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 132
(describing as "magical thinking" the attempt to change the characteristics of a defen-
dant by simply changing the location of a hearing).
61 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
62 For both adult and juvenile offenders pre-Roper, the Eighth Amendment barred
imposition of the death penalty in cases of felony-murder convictions where the de-
fendant did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
797 (1982). Although Roper instituted a blanket prohibition on the juvenile death
penalty, harsh LWOP sentences nonetheless persist. The result is ironic: juveniles
convicted of felony murder are effectively deemed as culpable as their peers who have
committed murder, as both groups are now likely to serve juvenile LWOP sentences.
63 See MYERS, supra note 11, at 75-84 (providing data from these studies and noting
the difficulties of conducting them because of transfer "selection bias"). For an exam-
ple of how sentencing differs in the adult and juvenile courts, see Brad Lendon, Town
Torn over 'Confession' by Accused Killer Arsonist, 10, CNN.coM, Oct. 1, 2007, http://
www.cnn.com/2007/US/law/10/01/arson.child (comparing the eleven years that a
ten-year-old boy might spend in juvenile custody if convicted on murder counts with
the life imprisonment he could face if labeled as a serious youthful offender).
64 Feld, supra note 49, at 119; see also Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences
of Transfer, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 227,
248-64 (comparing the experiences of youth in juvenile placements and adult prisons).
20081 1061
1062 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 156:1049
victimization. One way of avoiding these negative effects is by chal-
lenging the validity of the mechanisms that result in juvenile transfers
to adult court and the imposition of adult sentences. The Roper find-
ings allow for a further critique of one of criminal law's most criticized
rules-the felony-murder doctrine.
III. THE FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE AND ITS RATIONALE
The felony-murder rule is a form of strict liability in the criminal
context. The doctrine reflects the pinnacle of inconsistency between
an actor's culpability and his subsequent punishment. As I will ex-
plain in Part V, this inconsistency is particularly blatant in the juvenile
context. In this Part, however, I will briefly explain the doctrine and
outline the basic arguments against its continued use in criminal
prosecutions.
Felony murder operates as a charge separate from any other felony
charges, and criminalizes the acts that result in death during the com-
mission of a felony crime. 65 The doctrine allows a defendant to be
found guilty of murder if someone dies in the course of an attempted
commission or completion of any felony.66 Unlike other homicide
crimes, the felony-murder rule does not carry an independent mens reaS 67
requirement. For example, in a kidnapping gone awry that resulted
in death, a prosecutor only needs to prove the elements of a kidnap-
ping and the fact of a resulting death for a felony-murder conviction.
No intent to murder is necessary to sustain a felony-murder conviction,
which may carry the consequences of a first- or second-degree murder
charge.6 In its simplest form, the doctrine amounts to strict liability for
death during a felony for both direct actors and accomplices. 9
65 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06, at 515
(3d ed. 2001) (providing a basic overview of the rule); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAw § 14.5, at 444 (2d ed. 2003) (same).
66 DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[A], at 515.
67 In other words, a prosecutor does not need to show that a defendant intention-
ally, recklessly, negligently, or even accidentally killed. Id.; Drizin & Keegan, supra
note 16, at 527.
68 See DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[A], at 515 (explaining that a conviction of
graded murder offenses may depend on whether a felony is enumerated or unspecified).
69 Id. For an example of an accomplice charged with felony murder, see Stacey
T.'s case, discussed in Part IV, infra.
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Like many criminal law docrines, the felony-murder rule has twoS 70
theoretical underpinnings: deterrence and retribution. In princi-
ple, the felony-murder rule deters both the careless commission of
crimes and the underlying crimes themselves. 7' The deterrence justi-
fication for the rule assumes that if a criminal is aware that he will be
subject to severe punishment for any death he causes during the
commission of a felony, then he will either be more careful in com-
pleting his crime or he will altogether abandon his criminal pursuit.
With respect to punishment, the rule employs a harm-based view of
retribution: 72 if death occurs during the commission of a felony, then
the individual is punished for the harm he causes even where it is be-
yond any harm he intends. This heightened retribution signifies the
social value placed upon human life-where a person ends a life, he is
regarded as a "bad person,"73 and thus encounters severe punishment
for his unacceptable social harm.74  Despite scholarly attacks that
the rule's deterrence and retribution justifications fail,75 the rule per-
sists in virtually all American jurisdictions.76
70 DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[B], at 516-19; Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime:
Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74-78 (1991).
71 See Cole, supra note 70, at 78-79 (highlighting the dual deterrent function of the
rule). Contra DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[B] [2], at 516 n.119 (arguing that the
"rule is not intended to deter the underlying felony").
72 See Cole, supra note 70, at 74-76 (distinguishing "intent-based" and "harm-
based" retribution).
73 Drizin & Keegan, supra note 16, at 527-28 (citing LAFAVE, supra note 65, § 7.5, at
682).
74 See DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[B] [3], at 517-18 (explaining that propo-
nents justify the rule as "[r]eaffirming the sanctity of human life"); David Crump &
Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
359, 367-69 (1985) (defending the rule on the basis that it encapsulates condemnation
and expiation); James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of
the Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1472-79 (1994)
(explaining a divergence between public and scholarly perceptions of fault, whereby
the public feels that it is acceptable to impose harmful and severe sanctions upon a
person already stigmatized as a felon).
75 See DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[B] [2]-[3], at 516-18 (arguing that the rule
cannot deter unintended and unforeseen deaths and that severe punishments depart
from accepted rules of culpability).
76 See id. § 31.06[A], at 515 n.110 (noting that only three states have rejected the
rule and that a fourth state has imposed a mens rea requirement for felony-murder
convictions); Crump & Crump, supra note 74, at 359 ("Scholarly denunciation has had
little effect upon [the rule's] retention."). A result of the rule-and a likely reason for
its continued prevalence-is easing the prosecutor's burden of proving murder of-
fenses. DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[B] [5], at 519. Another argument is that the
rule allows for a more efficient allocation of scarce resources. Crump & Crump, supra
note 74, at 374.
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With respect to deterrence, proponents of the rule argue that in-
dividuals are deterred from engaging in criminal conduct by the
threat of punishment; the rule punishes those people that actively re-
sist deterrence and instead favor risk and criminal conduct. 7v Propo-
nentsjustify strict liability for felony murder, but not the criminal law
generally, by asserting that no overdeterrence problem exists in the
78felony-murder context. They also argue that the felony-murder rule
operates to deter "triggering felonies by lottery." 79
Throughout its long history, the rule has always been met with
80
opposition. Critics argue, for example, that any deterrence justifica-
tion fails. First, they argue that unintended, or even unforeseen,
acts-here, the resulting death-cannot be deterred."' Second, they
argue that no empirical evidence supports the deterrence justification
for the doctrine. Third, they argue that a felony-murder rule is un-
necessary to deter underlying felonies because those felonies are de-
terred simply by increasing punishments for the intentional felony of-
fenses. 
8 3
77 See Cole, supra note 70, at 80, 90-92 (arguing that the rule properly punishes
risk-preferring felons who disregard threatened sanctions).
78 See id. at 102 (explaining that overdeterrence in the felony-murder context is
not possible because the rule only operates against those who are already engaged in
criminal conduct, and thus would not deter socially beneficial action). Other argu-
ments for strict liability in the felony-murder context include heightened blamewor-
thiness, the "long-sentence" phenomenon, the saliency of the felony-murder message,
considerations of the defendant's character, and the dangerousness of underlying ac-
tivity. Id. at 99-106. But see Tomkovicz, supra note 74, at 1452-55 (arguing that strict
liability in the criminal context is generally limited to public welfare or regulatory of-
fenses where "the gains to society are thought great, and the costs to the individual are
considered tolerable," and where "alternative versions of an offense that otherwise re-
quires mens rea" do not exist).
79 See Cole, supra note 70, at 110 (explaining that underlying felonies can be de-
terred when individuals are subject to a "lottery" in which their punishment for identi-
cal offenses increases as a result of a chance death).
80 The rule likely emerged in England in its current form in the 1700s and was
stated by William Blackstone in 1769. Drizin & Keegan, supra note 16, at 529. Felony
murder was finally abolished in England in 1957 after over one hundred years of criti-
cism. Id. at 528.
81 DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[B] [2], at 516-17.
82 See id. § 31.06[B] [2], at 517 (noting that felony murders are rare and that no
data capture whether any resulting deaths would go unpunished under normal mur-
der charges requiring proof of mens rea); see also Tomkovicz, supra note 74, at 1457
(referring to the unsupported claim that the felony-murder rule saves lives as the "de-
terrence delusion").
83 DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[B] [2], at 516 n.119. But see Crump & Crump,
supra note 74, at 369-71 (supporting the deterrence justification for the rule).
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Retributivists justify the rule on harm-based principles.8 4  Critics
argue, however, that the rule fails to capture a wrongdoer's culpability
properly and that harm-based rules commingle punishment and
compensation.5 Critics object most fervently to the idea that a person
who unintentionally or accidentally kills will be subject to society's
harshest punishments, which are traditionally reserved for the most
culpable offenders. 
6
Despite these criticisms of the deterrence and retribution justifica-
tions for the rule, the felony-murder doctrine remains a strong pres-
ence in the U.S. criminal justice system.87 That the doctrine is faulty,
however, becomes even more apparent in the juvenile context. The
objective of this Part has been to explain the felony-murder doctrine
and outline the basic arguments against its continued use. In light of
the rule's prevalence, I will now turn to explaining how the rule's ap-
plication to juveniles increases their likelihood of being convicted in
adult court, which then subjects them to harsh, and often mandatory,
adult sentences. After providing an illustration of the rule's ramifica-
tions when applied against juveniles in Part IV, Part V will demon-
strate why public policy should exclude juvenile offenders from fel-
ony-murder prosecutions.
IV. JUVENILE "ADULTS" AND LIFE WITHOUT
POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE SENTENCES
Children prosecuted and convicted in adult courts face the poten-
tial for severe sentences, the harshest of which is now life imprison-
84 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (explaining that the rule punishes
the defendant for all harm caused, regardless of intent); see also Crump & Crump, su-
pra note 74, at 362-63 (justifying the felony-murder rule on actus reus grounds).
85 See H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY:
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 113, 130-31 (1968) (using the compensation-
punishment analysis to criticize efforts to differentiate attempted and completed crimes).
See DRESSLER, supra note 65, § 31.06[B] [3], at 517 (explaining that punishment
should be based on culpability, not harm caused); see also Tomkovicz, supra note 74, at
1441 (noting that the rule may "result in gradation at a disproportionately severe level
considering the established mental fault"). Some courts have expressed discomfort
with the rule on this basis. See infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
87 See Tomkovicz, supra note 74, at 1464-67 (attributing the rule's survival to law-
and-order politics, limitations on its scope, and differences in the way scholars and the
public perceive fault); id. at 1476 (arguing that "the public is less concerned about
precision and exactitude in gauging proportionality" and feels differently about the
"punishment that killers in felony-murder contexts deserve").
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ment without possibility of parole. 88 Although it is difficult to know
precisely how many children are successfully prosecuted in adult
courts,89 about 2225 juveniles were serving state or federal juvenile
LWOP sentences as of 2004. 90 Of the 2225 juvenile LWOP inmates, an
estimated sixteen percent-354 individuals-were imprisoned for
crimes they committed before their sixteenth birthdays. 9' Approxi-
mately ninety-three percent ofjuvenile LWOP inmates were convicted
of homicide charges, a category that includes felony murder. 92 An es-
timated one-quarter to one-half of juvenile LWOP sentences resulted
from felony-murder convictions. 93 Law-and-order 94 youth crime poli-
cies and increased waiver provisions have thus left children vulnerable
to incarceration under the lengthiest of sentences.
88 Roper relied on a decline in the number of states permitting or imposing juve-
nile executions to find that a growing national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty had emerged, ultimately to hold that the punishment had become cruel and
unusual. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-68 (2005). In contrast to the rare
imposition of juvenile death sentences, multiple states continue to impose juvenile
LWOP sentences. See State v. Craig, 944 So. 2d 660, 662 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (holding
post-Roper juvenile LWOP sentences constitutional); Commonwealth v. Wilson, 911
A.2d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that Roper "does not affect the imposition
of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole"); see also State v. Standard, 569
S.E.2d 325, 329 (S.C. 2002) (upholding ajuvenile LWOP sentence as constitutional);
State v. Jensen, 579 N.W.2d 613, 624-25 (S.D. 1998) (same); People v. Launsburry, 551
N.W.2d 460, 463 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (same); State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 482, 489-90
(Idaho 1992) (same).
89 Figures are available only for children prosecuted in adult court under ajudicial
waiver, rather than under a prosecutorial waiver or statutory exclusion. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 25 (estimating the number ofjuvenile LWOP inmates
based on limited data provided by state corrections departments of forty of the forty-
two states allowing juvenile LWOP sentences).
90 Id. States' reliance on harsh juvenile sentences has generally increased: in
1990, "2,234 youth [were] convicted of murder in the United States, 2.9 percent of
whom were sentenced to life without parole," whereas in 2000 the number of youth
murderers dropped to 1006, but 9.1 percent were sentenced to life without parole. Id.
at 2, 31-33 figs.3-4 & tbl.4.
91 Id. at 25, 26 tbl.2.
92 Id. at 27 fig.2.
93 Id. at 27-28 (noting that twenty-six percent of LWOP survey respondents self-
reported sentences that resulted from felony murder convictions, thirty-three percent
of twenty-four juvenile LWOP inmates investigated in Colorado in 2005 were incarcer-
ated on felony murder convictions, and nearly fifty percent of 146 juvenile LWOP in-
mates surveyed by the ACLU in Michigan in 2004 received LWOP sentences as a result
of "felony murder or for 'aiding and abetting' a murder in which another person
pulled the trigger").
94 See Tomkovicz, supra note 74, at 1461-63 (explaining characteristics of a law-and-
order landscape, including a preference for "tough, punitive approaches" to dealing
with criminals).
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The case of Stacey T.-a fourteen-year-old tried, convicted, and
sentenced under Pennsylvania criminal laws95-is illustrative of legisla-
tive waivers that propel children into adult court, where they become
subject to LWOP sentences because of the mandatory sentences at-
tached to the charges on which they are convicted. Stacey agreed to
participate in a scheme with two adult codefendants, 96 in which the
group would rob, kidnap, and hold Stacey's sixteen-year-old friend
97Alexander Porter for ransom . Stacey was involved in luring Porter to
an apartment for a purported drug deal with the adult codefendants. 9s
At the apartment, the group pretended that Stacey had bungled the
deal. Stacey then allowed his codefendants to restrain him as a ruse to
instill fear in Porter that they would do the same to him if he failed to
provide the keys to his parents' separate homes.99 After the defen-
dants bound Porter and locked him in a vehicle trunk, they told him
that Stacey had been killed, even though the boy had simply been re-
leased and told to go home. 00
Over the next two days, Stacey's adult codefendants kept Porter
locked in the vehicle's trunk and eventually shot and killed him in a
park.'0 1 Stacey had agreed to participate in the robbery scheme, but
murder was never discussed beforehand, and he was not present for• • 102
the killing. As a result of waiver provisions, he was charged in adult
court and convicted of second-degree felony murder, robbery, kid-
95 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 29-30; see also Commonwealth v. Pel-
zer, 612 A.2d 407, 411 (Pa. 1992) (affirming the first-degree murder convictions and
death penalty sentences imposed on Stacey's adult codefendants); Commonwealth v.
Daniels, 612 A.2d 395, 405 (Pa. 1992) (same). Stacey, who is now thirty-two years old,
remains incarcerated for events that transpired when he was fourteen. For more re-
cent developments in Stacey's case, see Commonwealth v. Torrance, 876 A.2d 471, 471
tbl. (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (affirming the dismissal of Stacey's third postconviction relief
petition), appeal denied, 881 A.2d 819, 819 tbl. (Pa. 2005); Letter Brief-PCRA Appeal at
1-2, Torrance, 876 A.2d 471 (No. 3659 EDA 2003), 2004 WL 2475964 (explaining the
procedural history and postconviction relief petition).
96 The adult codefendants were young adults, and one was Stacey's cousin. Pelzer,
612 A.2d at 411; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 30. It is common for juvenile
murder offenses to include adult co-offenders-a little over one-third of offenses in-
clude an adult offender. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 17, at 65 fig. "[T] he vast
majority (87%) of [these adult offenders are] under age 25." Id. at 66. Stacey's case,
then, is somewhat characteristic ofjuvenile murder offenses.
97 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 30.
98 Pelzer, 612 A.2d at 411.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
1W HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 30.
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napping, criminal conspiracy, and two counts of burglary. °3 On the
felony-murder conviction, he received a mandatory sentence of life
without parole. 104 Even though Stacey was only fourteen years old and
had no prior criminal history, 11 his case was automatically filed in
adult court because of legislative waiver. 0 6 Tried in adult court, Sta-
cey became subject to adult sentencing schemes; convicted of second-
degree felony murder, he received the legislatively mandated sentence
of life imprisonment. 107
As Stacey T.'s case demonstrates, charging juveniles with high-
level offenses that require no additional culpability determination has
significant ramifications for sentencing. If convicted of a felony-
murder charge, juveniles are often subject to corresponding manda-
tory sentencing laws that remove a judge's discretion to account for a
juvenile offender's individual characteristics and his level of threat to
public safety.1 08
Although the Supreme Court abolished the use of the juvenile
death penalty nearly three years ago, legislators have yet to examine
critically the use of felony-murder charges and their corresponding
juvenile LWOP sentences in the post-Roper landscape. 0 9 Even those
states that continue to value punishment over rehabilitation for seri-
ous juvenile offenders should consider the broader implications of
Roper for juvenile prosecutions. The Roper Court's focus on culpability
and character110 severely undercuts the justifications for applying fel-
ony-murder rules to youth.
103 Letter Brief-PCRA Appeal, supra note 95, at 1.
104 Id.
105 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 29.
106 Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142, § 2 (current version at 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 6355(e) (2006)) (excluding murder offenses from the juvenile court's jurisdic-
tion); see also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
107 See Letter Brief-PCRA Appeal, supra note 95, at 1.
108 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 37 (illustrating that "the eight states
with the highest rates of sentencing youth to life without parole all make the sentence
mandatory upon conviction for certain crimes"); id. at 90-92 (discussing the discomfort
judges often express when forced to impose a mandatory sentence upon a juvenile).
Twenty-seven states have mandatory LWOP statutes. See id. at tbl.6. Conversely, seven
states-Alaska, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, New Mexico, New York, and West Virginia-
and the District of Columbia prohibit LWOP for youth. Id. at 2. Other states allow the
sentence to be imposed at ajudge's discretion. See id. at 38 tbl.6.
109 Even pre-Roper, legislators largely had other concerns. See MYERS, supra note
11, at 10 (explaining that public attention was focused on war, terrorism, and home-
land security rather than youth violence).
110 See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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V. DISMANTLING THE FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE
AFTER ROPER V. SIMMONS
As explained above, the felony-murder rule has found justification
in the punishment theories of deterrence and retribution. Even pro-
ponents of the felony-murder rule, however, acknowledge that the
rule must have limits and exceptions to ensure that it is applied only
where its rationale is forwarded."' The felony-murder rule's justifica-
tions of deterrence and retribution fail in the juvenile context, as the
doctrine neither deters youth crime nor achieves justice. But given
that critics have raised similar arguments in the adult context and
have been largely unsuccessful in eradicating the rule, why should this
same criticism prevail with respect tojuveniles?
As Stacey T.'s case demonstrates, felony-murder charges compel
the justice system to treat juvenile offenders as adults. Subsequent
felony-murder convictions often classify juveniles among the worst of-
fenders and subject them to the second harshest punishment imposed
upon adults, and the harshest punishment currently allowed against
juveniles: life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. As ap-
plied to juvenile offenders, however, the rule acts as a conviction trap
that subjects children to lengthy sentences without deterring similar
conduct by their peers or properly achieving just deserts.112
Ropers findings as to the "[t]hree general differences between juve-
niles under 18 and adults"1 3 informed the Court's decision to abolish
the juvenile death penalty as constitutionally impermissible under the
III See Crump & Crump, supra note 74, at 377 ("The policy underlying the rule
should influence legislatures and the judiciary in fashioning exceptions; conversely,
the lack of a relationship between the supporting rationale and the limits may be a
sign that the doctrine itself is flawed."). The felony-murder rule has been limited in
scope by, for example, the merger principle, causation doctrines, agency theories, and
dangerousness limitations. Id.
T2 I would further posit that felony-murder charges influence ajudge's decision to
grant a reverse waiver. Assume a fifteen-year-old, first-time juvenile offender kills dur-
ing the commission of a robbery. Without a felony-murder rule, the prosecutor might
only be able to charge the juvenile with felony robbery and manslaughter. Depending
on the child's age, a reverse waiver to the juvenile court may still leave that court with
enough jurisdictional time to place the juvenile in a secure setting while achieving re-
habilitation. In this jurisdiction, however, a felony-murder charge may make the juve-
nile subject to an LWOP sentence. A judge will likely deny the petition for a reverse
waiver where the difference between sentences available in juvenile court and adult
court is significant-here, for example, six to nine years in juvenile court (depending
on the upper age limits of the juvenile court's jurisdiction)-as compared with life im-
prisonment in adult court.
",s Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.1 1 4 The Court's first finding-that
juveniles have a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of re-
sponsibility," which are "qualities [that] often result in impetuous and
ill-considered actions and decisions"11 5-- directly impacts deterrence. If
juveniles rarely consider the immediate consequences of their actions,
then they are even less likely to consider the unforeseen consequences
of their actions and the increased punishment they will face should
their criminal conduct go awry and result in death.
The Court's second finding-"that juveniles are more vulnerable or
susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure"' '6-also thwarts juvenile deterrence. Even if ajuvenile did un-
characteristically consider the consequences of his actions, he might still
feel compelled to engage in the behavior because of peer pressure.
Social science research and biological comparisons support the
Court's determination that the mental processes ofjuveniles and adults
differ. Studies have shown that juveniles' brains have not fully matured,
which leaves juveniles plagued by immature thought processes and, as a
result, an inability to thoughtfully plan or anticipate consequences,
minimize risk and danger, or adapt or reason in unfamiliar or stressful
situations."7 Moreover, adolescents often experience feelings of having
only one choice; their inexperience or inability to engage in rational
thinking leaves them unable to consider multiple possibilities." 8 Social
scientists further observe that "[d]uring the time these processes are
developing, it doesn't make sense to ask the average adolescent to think
or act like the average adult, because he or she can't-any more than a
six-year-old child can learn calculus."" 9 Social science research is bol-
stered by neurodevelopmental findings that the last area of the brain to
mature is the inferior frontal lobe-most specifically the prefrontal cor-
tex12 0-which governs judgment, impulse control, and decision making.
114 The Court also relied on a national consensus against the juvenile death pen-
alty and international denunciation of the practice in reaching its holding. See supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
"5 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quotingJohnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
116 Id.
117 See Beyer, supra note 31, at 27-28 (reporting common perceptions of court-
involved juveniles that reflect their immaturity and incomplete cognitive development).
118 Id.
119 Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial, CRIM.JUST., Fall 2003, at 20, 22.
120 Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Child-
hood Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 8174, 8177-78 (2004), avail-
able at http://pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0402680101; see also HUMAN RIGHTS
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These findings pertain to normal children and adolescents; decision-
making abilities among juvenile offenders who, as a class, "have a much
higher rate of mental disorders than do adolescents in general""' may
be even more impaired.
The Court's findings in Roper, coupled with the aforementioned so-
cial science and neurodevelopmental research, frustrate the felony-
murder rule's underlying rationale. Whatever minimal degree of de-
terrence the rule arguably generates in adults is lost on adolescents. 3
It is difficult to find justification for the felony-murder doctrine in the
juvenile context. Its proponents generally argue that the rule deters the
careless commission of a crime and potentially even the underlying fel-
ony. The rule will not deter teenagers, however, because teenagers fail
to anticipate or plan a course of events or to minimize risks and dan-124
ger. Other proponents argue that the rule sends a clear message that
any potential felon can understand: if you commit a crime and happen
to kill someone, then you go down for murder.125 Even if teenagers are
subconsciously aware of this message, however, their tendency to mis-
perceive risk and their inability to remove themselves from problematic
situations will counteract any deterrent effect. If empirical evidence as
to the rule's deterrent effects is lacking in the adult context,12" then
surely it is absent in the juvenile context.
The Roper findings may call into question the retribution justifica-
tion for the felony-murder rule even more significantly. The Court
has acknowledged that a child's culpability is categorically less than
that of an adult. In Roper, the Court stated "that the character of aju-
venile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits
of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed." 127 Harm-based retributiv-
WATCH, supra note 8, at 48 (identifying functions of the frontal lobe), Daniel R.
Weinberger, A Brain Too Young for Good Judgment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at A13
(noting that youth lack a mature prefrontal cortex).
121 Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making of
Delinquent Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE
JUSTICE 33, 34 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (explaining that men-
tal disorders and other psychosocial factors influence juveniles' decision-making proc-
esses).
12 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
:23 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
124 Beyer, supra note 31, at 27.
125 Crump & Crump, supra note 74, at 371.
26 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
127 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005); see also SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra
note 17, at 71 (noting that the majority of juveniles do not continue to commit legal
offenses as adults).
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ists who support the felony-murder rule, however, seek to impose pun-
ishment for the results an offender caused without taking into ac-
count the offender's individual characteristics. In defending this per-
spective, they assert that "condemnation is the expression of solidarity
with the victims of crime" and that the rule "is a useful doctrine be-
cause it reaffirms to the surviving family... the kinship the society as a
whole feels with [it] by denouncing in the strongest language of the
law the intentional crime that produced the death."2 " Although it is
proper to denounce senseless death, this message conflicts with the
Court's aforementioned findings as to juvenile culpability, especially
when the message is accompanied by severe imprisonment sentences.
While the Court acknowledges children's developing character and
lesser culpability, the effect of the felony-murder rule is to disregard the
potential for change and to instead define a teen by his single act. For
teens, the message is more complex: "We realize that you are still de-
veloping, but you were foolish and careless and killed someone; so now,
you can go develop your character in jail." For child offenders who kill,
their acts are most likely analogous to involuntary manslaughter, for
which sentences normally range from one to ten years in prison;129 on
the other hand, felony-murder convictions may subject teens to juvenile
LWOP sentences. Judges forced to apply the felony-murder doctrine
note their discomfort with its resultant sentences:
While I concur in the majority opinion, I cannot help but believe that as
we treat more and more children as adults and impose harsher and
harsher punishment, the day will soon come when we look back on these
cases as representing a regrettable era in our criminal justice system. As
we were developing our juvenile justice system, we sought to treat chil-
dren differently from adults because we recognized they had not devel-
oped the problem-solving skills of adults. We now lump certain children
in the same category as adults and mete out harsh punishment to them,
ignoring the differences between childhood and adulthood. 1
30
Moreover, and especially in cases of accomplices or juveniles tried
with conspiracy, research findings that juveniles "lack the freedom
that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting"'1'
128 Crump & Crump, supra note 74, at 368.
129 See Drizin & Keegan, supra note 16, at 525 (citing to a Georgia case in which a
teen would have received one to ten years in prison if convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter, but instead received a mandatory life sentence for felony murder).
'5o Id. at 526 (quoting Miller v. State, 571 S.E.2d 788, 798-99 (Ga. 2002) (Benham,
J., concurring)).
131 Steinberg & Scott, supra note 33, at 1014.
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should insulate juveniles from the imposition of harm-based retribu-
tivist principles. In fact, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed a trial
judge's decision in which he grappled with sentencing a fifteen-year-
old defendant convicted of multiple-murder charges to natural life
imprisonment, and instead ended up reducing the sentence to fifty
years of imprisonment:
I have.., been very concerned about what this meant, what this meant
to [the defendant] as a 15-year-old child, what this meant to society at
large, to be part of a society where a 15-year-old child on a theory of ac-
countability only, passive accountability, would suffer a sentence of life in
the Penitentiary without the possibility of parole .... I feel that it is clear
that in my mind this is blatantly unfair and highly unconscionable, and
let me state that I do not believe for a second that Mr. Miller is innocent
of these charges. I believe he received a fair trial. I believe he was ade-
quately represented. I believe he was proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, and I believe he should suffer harsh criminal consequences for
acting as a look-out in this case, but to suggest that he ought to receive a
sentence of life without the possibility of parole, I find... unconscion-
able. I am concerned that a person under the age of 18 under Illinois
law can do everything that John Gacy did, can torture and abuse and
murder over 30 people, and would be in the same boat as [the defen-
dant] right now[,] looking at a sentence of a minimum and maximum of
life without the possibility of parole.
I have a 15-year-old child who was passively acting as a look-out for
other people, never picked up a gun, never had much more than-
perhaps less than a minute-to contemplate what this entire incident is
about, and he is in the same situation as a serial killer for sentencing
132
purposes.
This passage illustrates the tension between recognizing culpability
differences between juveniles and adults and nonetheless subjecting
them to the same sentencing schemes. Furthermore, any retributive
justification is undermined by the fact that even where the public has
supported trying juveniles as adults, they do not support imposing the
same sanctions upon teens as they do adults. 13  Similarly, any incapaci-
tation justification 134 for lengthy felony-murder sentences is undercut in
the juvenile context because of youths' potential for rehabilitation.135
Consider again a hypothetical prosecution-for example, of boy
B-a situation similar to Stacey T.'s case. B's case is a typical example
132 People v. Miller, 781 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Il1. 2002).
133 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
134 See Cole, supra note 70, at 82, 93.
135 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
2008] 1073
1074 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:1049
of both youth crime policy and teen behavior, as it involved both him
and a few of his peers. 136 Specifically, B was involved in a scheme
with an older teen and his cousin to rob his friend. He was not pre-
sent for his friend's murder, which occurred two days after his last
contact with the group, but he was still charged with felony murder
and subjected to the adult court's jurisdiction under a mandatory leg-
islative waiver provision."' Despite being only fourteen years old and
having no prior court involvement, because of the seriousness of the
charged offense, the adult court did not grant a reverse waiver that
would allow B to be tried in juvenile court. 18 After trial, B was con-
victed of second-degree felony murder and received a mandatory sen-
tence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 139
It is hard to see how B's conviction provides support for the dual
justifications for the felony-murder rule. B's peers will not be de-
terred from socializing with relatives or peers, nor will B's conviction
deter them from engaging in criminal conduct if they perceive them-
selves as immune from the same outcome. Furthermore, it is difficult
to argue that B received his just deserts. Is this fourteen-year-old first-
time offender so immoral or such a threat to public safety that he de-
serves to be imprisoned for the rest of his life? Social science and
neurodevelopmental research indicates that it might be developmen-
tally proper to hold juveniles to diminished culpability standards when
sentenced in adult court. Felony-murder rules represent the other ex-
treme: despite juveniles' recognized immaturity and lesser culpability,
they are subjected to hyper-retributive criminal sanctions.
The imposition of felony-murder rules on juveniles is an irrational
legal response to youth crime and violence. Youth crime policy will
136 See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 17, at 65 ("Murders by juveniles in 2002
were less likely to be committed by a juvenile acting alone than in any year since at
least 1980.... Between 1980 and 2002, the annual proportion of murders involving a
juvenile offender acting alone gradually declined, from 66% in the 1980s, to 59% in
the 1990s, to 55% in the years 2000 to 2002.").
137 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355(e) (2006) (excluding murder offenses from
juvenile courtjurisdiction in the absence of decertification proceedings).
138 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6322 (2006) (codifying the decertification, or
reverse waiver, process). The court record and Human Rights Watch report are un-
clear as to whether Stacey T. petitioned for anything akin to a decertification hearing,
which was codified in 1995 and amended in 2000. This argument assumes a prosecu-
tion brought in 2006 that is similar in facts to Stacey T.'s case.
139 See Commonwealth v. Carter, 855 A.2d 885, 892 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding
that it is not cruel and unusual punishment to impose a sentence of life imprisonment
on ajuvenile tried in adult court and convicted of felony murder).
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inevitably involve both juvenile and adult courts.140 Sound policy
should not, however, abandon our understanding of youth and devel-
opment simply because a teenager enters a criminal courtroom rather
than ajuvenile courtroom. 4' To proceed in such a way is to proceed
by way of a legal fiction. Instead, sound juvenile crime policy, whether
administered in ajuvenile court or an adult court, should account for
youths' lesser culpability and enable youth to develop and reform. '4
If these are the goals of sound policy-which the Court adopted (at
least with respect to classification of children among the "worst of-
fenders") in Roper-then the felony-murder rule fails in two ways.
First, as the above discussion demonstrates, the deterrence and retri-
bution justifications for the rule fail as applied to juveniles. Second,
the rigidity of the rule, which disregards culpability and character,
fails as sound legal policy.
CONCLUSION
Three years after the Roper decision, its legacy remains uncertain.
If courts, prosecutors, legislators, advocates, and the public take its
findings as to juvenile culpability and character seriously, however,
then Roper will be a landmark holding not only for its abolition of the
juvenile death penalty but also for its ability to refocus youth crime
policy. Roper's reasoning centers on juvenile culpability and charac-
ter; an expansion of its principles exposes an already-vulnerable fel-
ony-murder rule to even greater attacks. The felony-murder doc-
trine's justifications of deterrence and retribution fail in the juvenile
context. The minimal degree of deterrence that the felony-murder
rule offers is lost on adolescents, and its harsh, retributivist goals
should not apply to juveniles where the Court has acknowledged that
a child's culpability is categorically less than that of an adult.
'40 See ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 132 (recognizing that there are indeed situations
ofjuvenile crime that call for a punitive response); Franklin E. Zimring &Jeffrey Fa-
gan, Transfer Policy and Law Reform, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE,
supra note 1, at 407, 420 (noting that "the achievement ofjustice in transfer cases de-
pends on the quality ofjustice in the criminal courts," "substantive interdependence,"
and the evolution of "explicit policies toward youths ... in criminal courts, or the en-
tire system is rendered arbitrary").
See ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 70 (noting that substantive policies should apply
across court systems).
142 See id. at 75 (citing "diminished responsibility" as a rationale for a particularized
youth crime policy); id. at 81 (citing "room to reform" as another rationale for such a
policy).
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Adolescent killings undoubtedly present significant challenges for
any justice system, 43 and applying felony-murder charges to juveniles
only further complicates existing tensions. Not only does the doctrine
completely contradict the Roper findings, it subjects juveniles to un-
necessarily long prison sentences. Public policy that forbids prosecu-
tors from charging juveniles with felony murder chips away at one of
the major prosecutorial tools that results in juvenile LWOP sentences,
which have been recognized internationally as disproportionate pun-
ishments that fail to reflect a child's moral culpability and criminal re-
sponsibility.144 Forbidding the use of felony-murder charges also refo-
cuses public and institutional attention on achieving a balance among
juvenile culpability, rehabilitation, and retribution. A first step toward
a better youth crime policy that values proportionality and the ability
ofjuveniles' characters to develop and reform, then, is the categorical
exclusion of the felony-murder rule as applied to juveniles.
14s See id. at 131-156 (describing the acute tensions that surface in cases of adoles-
cent homicide).
4 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8, at 96; see also, e.g., Naovarath v. State,
779 P.2d 944, 948 (Nev. 1989) (holding that the imposition of a juvenile LWOP sen-
tence on a thirteen-year-old seventh-grader was cruel and unusual punishment "given
the undeniably lesser culpability of children... [and] their capacity for growth").
